

# Modelling Risk and Identifying Countermeasure in Organizations

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# Trends in Software Systems

## Involvement

Becoming more and more part of our life and very often they have a strong influence in our daily life decisions. Moreover, they are considered as integral and active part of the organization



## Need A Methodology that .....

- Incorporate **organization setting analysis** and system-to-be analysis during software development process
- Anticipate **uncertain event (i.e., risk) at organization** level

# Methodologies

## SE & Org. Analysis

TROPOS and KAOS

## Risk Analysis

FTA, ETA, FMECA, and HAZOP

Using software methodology as a baseline and performing risk analysis on design outcomes (even further phases outcomes)

# What's Wrong

- What happens if the risk is the result of **bad** requirement ?
- Introducing a **countermeasure** can be seen as a requirement modification, is it OK ?

⇓  
ROLLBACK to ~~REQUIREMENT ANALYSIS~~

# Hint for Modelling Framework

Doing Risk Analysis (including Countermeasure elicitation) along  
with Requirement Engineering Process

*by*

Extending **Tropos** in some extent by adopting **NASA-DDP** (Defect  
Detection and Prevention)

## Case Study: London Ambulance Service

Having a world-class ambulance service for London staffed by well-trained, enthusiastic and proud people who are all recognised for contributing to the provision of **high-quality patient care**


[<http://www.londonambulance.nhs.uk>]

Some criteria of having high-quality patient care:

- Reach the accident & emergency (A&E) location in time
- Allocate the appropriate ambulance

# Goal Model


- Modelling strategic interest of actors in organization
- Actuator: **Actor**, Agent, Role, Position
- Entities: **Goal**, Task, Resource
- Decomposition: **OR** and **AND**
- Contribution: Positive and Negative



[Bresciani, 2004]




# Three Layers Analysis



[Feather, 2004]

## Modelling Concepts:


- Use Tropos Modelling Framework **as much as possible**
- New Concepts:
  - Extends Tropos Goal Model into three layers: Goal, Event, and Treatment
  - Modification Relation



The steps of analysis are the following:

- Find alternative solutions to satisfy the top goals
- Evaluate alternative solutions against relevant risks
- Assess countermeasures to mitigate risks

Requirements = an alternative solution + a combination of countermeasures



# How we do refinement in each layer?

## Goal layer

Refine the top goals into subgoals s.t. there is an actor that can fulfil it

# How we do refinement in each layer?

## Event layer

Define the risks of the goal layer, and refine them s.t. we can assess the risk value of the leaf.

## How we do refinement in each layer?

Treatment layer

How to elicit a treatment for the event layer?

# How we do refinement in each layer?

## Treatment layer

How to elicit a treatment for the event layer?

## Countermeasure Type


- Avoidance
- Prevention
- Alleviation
- Detection
- Retention

# Avoidance

Tries to achieve the stakeholders' goals by choosing a risk free alternative

## Characteristic

The goal fulfilment is very important for the stakeholder






# Prevention

Reduce the leaf-risks until they are acceptable for the fulfilment of stakeholders' goals

## Characteristic

The risk obstructs significantly to the stakeholders' goals and it is unavoidable




# Alleviation

Reduce the risk by employing a countermeasure over the top-event

## Characteristic

Can not find any measures from the previous categories




# Detection

Mitigates an intermediate event in the event tree s.t it reduces the risks/top-events

## Characteristic

Several top-events share an intermediate-event




# Retention

Introduce a measure that does not reduce either likelihood nor severity of the risk

## Characteristic

Can not find any treatments to mitigate the risks



# Achievement

- A **modelling framework** to analyse, evaluate, and select among the alternatives that satisfies the stakeholders' goals and satisfies the preference (e.g., acceptable risk, minimizing the total cost);
- The solution is not only based on the stakeholders' goals but it **encompasses treatments** to manage the impacts of malicious events;
- Categories of measure that typically are used to deal with the risks in organizations. They are categorised as: avoidance, prevention, detection, alleviation, and retention.

## Future Works

Propose a quantitative reasoning mechanisms where the evidence is expressed in term of probability model

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
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Thank your for the attention

Discussion ?

# Goal-Risk Model for LAS Case Study



## GR-Tool

